第12章 Alaska And Its Problems (3)

Public opinion on the Pacific coast sought a remedy and soon found one in the terms of the treaty of purchase.That document, in dividing Alaska from Siberia, described a line of division running through Bering Sea, and in 1881 the Acting Secretary of the Treasury propounded the theory that this line divided not merely the islands but the water as well.There was a widespread feeling that all Bering Sea within this line was American territory and that all intruders from other nations were poachers.In accordance with this theory, the revenue cutter Corwin in 1886 seized three British vessels and hauled their skippers before the United States District Court of Sitka.Thomas F.Bayard, then Secretary of State under President Cleveland, did not recognize this theory of interpreting the treaty, but endeavored to right the grievance by a joint agreement with France, Germany, Japan, Russia, and Great Britain, the sealing nations, "for the better protection of the fur seal fisheries in Bering Sea."A solution had been almost reached, when Canada interposed.Lord Morley has remarked, in his "Recollections," how the voice of Canada fetters Great Britain in her negotiations with the United States.While Bayard was negotiating an agreement concerning Bering Sea which was on the whole to the advantage of the United States, he completed a similar convention on the more complicated question of the northeastern or Atlantic fisheries which was more important to Canada.This latter convention was unfavorably reported by the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, which foreshadowed rejection.Thereupon, in May, 1888, Lord Salisbury, the British Foreign Minister, withdrew from the Bering Sea negotiation.

At this critical moment Cleveland gave place to Harrison, and Bayard was succeeded by James G.Blaine, the most interesting figure in our diplomatic activities of the eighties.These years marked the lowest point in the whole history of our relations with other countries, both in the character of our agents and in the nature of the public opinion to which they appealed.Blaine was undoubtedly the most ill-informed of our great diplomats; yet a trace of greatness lingers about him.The exact reverse of John Quincy Adams, he knew neither law nor history, and he did not always inspire others with confidence in his integrity.On the other hand, the magnetic charm of his personality won many to a devotion such as none of our great men except Clay has received.

Blaine saw, moreover, though through a glass darkly, farther along the path which the United States was to take than did any of his contemporaries.It was his fate to deal chiefly in controversy with those accomplished diplomats, Lord Salisbury and Lord Granville, and it must have been among the relaxations of their office to point out tactfully the defects and errors in his dispatches.Nevertheless when he did not misread history or misquote precedents but wielded the broadsword of equity, he often caught the public conscience, and then he was not an opponent to be despised.