IN EVERY cultural tradition there are orthodoxies of war and certain of these are shared in all Western nations, no matter what the specific differences. There are certain clarion calls to all-out war effort, certain forms of reassurance in case of local defeats, certain regularities in the proportion of fatalities to surrenders, and certain rules of behavior for prisoners of war which are predictable in wars between Western nations just because they have a great shared cultural tradition which covers even warfare.
All the ways in which the Japanese departed from Western conventions of war were data on their view of life and on their convictions of the whole duty of man. For the purposes of a systematic study of Japanese culture and behavior it did not matter whether or not their deviations from our orthodoxies were crucial in a military sense; any of them might be important because they raised questions about the character of the Japanese to which we needed answers.
The very premises which Japan used to justify her war were the opposite of America's. She defined the international situation differently. America laid the war to the aggressions of the Axis. Japan, Italy, and Germany had unrighteously. offended against international peace by their acts of conquest. Whether the Axis had seized power in Manchukuo or in Ethiopia or in Poland, it proved that they had embarked on an evil course of oppressing weak peoples. They had sinned against an international code of“live and let live”or at least of“open doors”for free enterprise. Japan saw the cause of the war in another light. There was anarchy in the world as long as every nation had absolute sovereignty; it was necessary for her to fight to establish a hierarchy-under Japan, of course, since she alone represented a nation truly hierarchal from top to bottom and hence understood the necessity of taking“one's proper place.”Japan, having attained unification and peace in her homeland, having put down banditry and built up roads and electric power and steel industries,having, according to her official figures, educated 99.5 percent of her rising generation in her public schools, should, according to Japanese premises of hierarchy, raise her backward younger brother China. Being of the same race as Greater East Asia, she should eliminate the United States, and after her Britain and Russia, from that part of the world and“take her proper place.”All nations were to be one world, fixed in an international hierarchy. In the next chapter we shall examine what this high value placed on hierarchy meant in Japanese culture. It was an appropriate fantasy for Japan to create. Unfortunately for her the countries she occupied did not see it in the same light. Nevertheless not even defeat has drawn from her moral repudiation of her Greater East Asia ideals, and even her prisoners of war who were least jingoistic rarely went so far as to arraign the purposes of Japan on the continent and in the Southwest Pacific. For a long, long time Japan will necessarily keep some of her inbred attitudes and one of the most important of these is her faith and confidence in hierarchy. It is alien to equality-loving Americans but it is nevertheless necessary for us to understand what Japan meant by hierarchy and what advantage she has learned to connect with it.
Japan likewise put her hopes of victory on a different basis from that prevalent in the United States.She would win, she cried, a victory of spirit over matter. America was big, her armaments were superior, but what did that matter? All this, they said, had been foreseen and discounted.“If we had been afraid of mathematical figures,”the Japanese read in their great newspaper, the Mainichi Shimbun,“the war would not have started. The enemy's great resources were not created by this war.”
Even when she was winning, her civilian statesmen, her High Command, and her soldiers repeated that this was no contest between armaments; it was a pitting of our faith in things against their faith in spirit. When we were winning they repeated over and over that in such a contest material power must necessarily fail. This dogma became, no doubt, a convenient alibi about the time of the defeats at Saipan and Iwo Jima, but it was not manufactured as an alibi for defeats. It was a clarion call during all the months of Japanese victories, and it had been an accepted slogan long before Pearl Harbor. In the nineteenthirties General Araki, fanatical militarist and one-time Minister of War, wrote in a pamphlet addressed“To the whole Japanese Race”that“the true mission”of Japan was“to spread and glorify the Imperial way to the end of the Four Seas. Inadequacy of strength is not our worry. Why should we worry about that which is material?”
Of course, like any other nation preparing for war, they did worry. All through the nineteen-thirties the proportion of their national income which was devoted to armament grew astronomically. By the time of their attack on Pearl Harbor very nearly half the entire national income was going to military and naval purposes, and of the total expenditures of the government only 17 percent were available for financing anything having to do with civilian administration. The difference between Japan and Western nations Was not that Japan was careless about material armament. But ships and guns were just the outward show of the undying Japanese Spirit. They were symbols much as the sword of the samurai had been the symbol of his virtue.
Japan was as completely consistent in playing up non-material resources as the United States was in its commitment to bigness. Japan had to campaign for all-out production just as the United States did, but her campaigns were based on her own premises. The spirit, she said, was all and was everlasting; material things were necessary, of course, but they were subordinate and fell by the way.“There are limits to material resources,”the Japanese radio would cry:“it stands to reason that material things cannot last a thousand years.”And this reliance on spirit was taken literally in the routine of war; their war catechisms used the slogan-and it was a traditional one. not made to order for this war-
“To match our training against their numbers and our flesh against their steel.”Their war manuals began with the bold-type line,“Read this and the war is won.”Their pilots who flew their midget planes in a suicidal crash into our warships were an endless text for the superiority of the spiritual over the material. They named them the Kamikaze Corps, for the kamikaze was the divine wind which had saved Japan from Genghis Khan's invasion in the thirteenth century by scattering and overturning his transports.
Even in civilian situations Japanese authorities took literally the dominance of spirit over material circumstances. Were people fatigued by twelve-hour work in the factories and all-night bombings?“The heavier our bodies, the higher our will, our spirit, rises above them.”“The wearier we are, the more splendid the training.”Were people cold in the bomb shelters in winter? On the radio the Dai Nippon Physical Culture Society prescribed body-warming calisthenics which would not only be a substitute for heating facilities and bedding, but, better still, would substitute for food no longer available to keep up people's normal strength.“Of course some may say that with the present food shortages we cannot think of doing calisthenics. No! The more shortage of food there is, the more we must raise our physical strength by other means.”That is, we must increase our physical strength by expending still more of it. The American's view of bodily energy which always reckons how much strength he has to use by whether he had eight or five hours of sleep last night, whether he has eaten his regular meals, whether he has been cold, is here confronted with a calculus that does not rely on storing up energy. That would be materialistic.
Japanese broadcasts went even farther during the war. In battle, spirit surmounted even the physical fact of death. One broadcast described a hero-pilot and the miracle of his conquest of death:
After the air battles were over, the Japanese planes returned to their base in small formations of three or four. A Captain was in one of the first planes to return. After alighting from his plane, he stood on the ground and gazed into the sky through binoculars. As his men returned, he counted. He looked rather pale, but he was quite steady. After the last plane returned he made out a report and proceeded to Headquarters. At Headquarters he made his report to the Commanding Officer. As soon as he had finished his report, however, he suddenly dropped to the ground. The officers on the spot rushed to give assistance but alas! he was dead. On examining his body it was found that it was already cold, and he had a bullet wound in his chest, which had proved fatal. It is impossible for the body of a newlydead person to be cold. Nevertheless the body of the dead captain was as cold as ice. The Captain must have been dead long before, and it was his spirit that made the report. Such a miraculous fact must have been achieved by the strict sense of responsibility that the dead Captain possessed.
To Americans, of course, this is an outrageous yarn but educated Japanese did not laugh at this broadcast. They felt sure it would not be taken as a tall tale by listeners in Japan. First they pointed out that the broadcaster had truthfully said that the captain's feat was“a miraculous fact.”
But why not? The soul could be trained; obviously the captain was a past-master of self-discipline. If all Japan knew that“a composed spirit could last a thousand years,”could it not last a few hours in the body of an air-force captain who had made“responsibility”the central law of his whole life? The Japanese believed that technical disciplines could be used to enable a man to make his spirit supreme. The captain had learned and profited.
As Americans we can completely discount these Japanese excesses as the alibis of a poor nation or the childishness of a deluded one. If we did, however, we would be, by that much, the 1ess able to deal with them in war or in peace. Their tenets have been bred into the Japanese by certain taboos and refusals, by certain methods of training and discipline,and these tenets are not mere isolated oddities. only if Americans have recognized them can we realize what they are saying when, in defeat, they acknowledge that spirit was not enough and that defending positions“with bamboo spears”was a fantasy. It is still more important that we be able to appreciate their acknowledgment that their spirit was insufficient and that it was matched in battle and in the factory by the spirit of the American people. As they said after their defeat: during the war they had“engaged in subjectivity.”
Japanese ways of saying all kinds of things during the war, not only about the necessity of hierarchy and the supremacy of spirit, were revealing to a student of comparative cultures, They talked constantly about security and morale being only a matter of being forewarned. No matter what the catastrophe, whether it was civilian bombing or defeat at Saipan or their failure to defend the Philippines, the Japanese line to their people was that this was fore-known and that there was therefore nothing to worry about. The radio went to great lengths, obviously counting on the reassurance it gave to the Japanese people to be told that they were living still in a thoroughly known world.“The American occupation of Kiska brings Japan within the radius of American bombers. But we were well aware of this contingency and have made the necessary preparations.”“The enemy doubtless will make an offensive against us by combined land, sea and air operations, but this has been taken account of by us in our plans.”Prisoners of war, even those who hoped for Japan's early defeat in a hopeless war, were sure that bombing would not weaken Japanese on the home front“because they were forewarned.”When Americans began bombing Japanese cities, the vice-president of the Aviation Manufacturer's Association broadcast:“Enemy planes finally have come over our very heads. However, we who are engaged in the aircraft production industry and who had always expected this to happen had made complete preparations to cope with this. Therefore, there is nothing to worry about.”Only granted all was fore-known, all was fully planned, could the Japanese go on to make the claim so necessary to them that everything had been actively willed by themselves alone; nobody had put anything over on them.“We should not think that we have been passively attacked but that we have actively pulled the enemy toward us.”“Enemy, come if you wish. Instead of saying,‘Finally what was to come has come, 'we will say rather,‘That which we were waiting for has come. We are glad it has come.’”The Navy Minister quoted in the Diet the teachings of the great warrior of the eighteenseventies, Takamori Saigo,“There are two kinds of opportunities: one which we chance upon, the other which we create. In time of great difficulty, one must not fail to create his opportunity.”And General Yamashito, when American troops marched into Manila,“remarked with a broad smile,”the radio said,“that now the enemy is in our bosom…”“The rapid fall of Manila, shortly after the enemy landings in Lingayen Bay, was only possible as a result of General Yamashito's tactics and in accordance with his plans. General Yamashito's operations are now making continuous progress.”In other words, nothing succeeds like defeat.
Americans went as far in the opposite direction as the Japanese in theirs. Americans threw themselves into the war effort because this fight had been forced upon us. We had been attacked, therefore let the enemy beware. No spokesman, planning how he could reassure the rank and file of Americans, said of Pearl Harbor or of Bataan,“These were fully taken account of by us in our plans.”Our officials said instead,“The enemy asked for it. We will show them what we can do.”Americans gear all their living to a constantly challenging world-and are prepared to accept the challenge. Japanese reassurances are based rather on a way of life that is planned and charted beforehand and where the greatest threat comes from the unforeseen.
Another constant theme in Japanese conduct of the war was also revealing about Japanese life. They continually spoke of how“the eyes of the world were upon them”. Therefore they must show to the full the spirit of Japan. Americans landed on Guadalcanal, and Japanese orders to troops were that now they were under direct observation“by the world”and should show what they were made of. Japanese seamen were warned that in case they were torpedoed and the order given to abandon ship, they should man the lifeboats with the utmost decorum or“the world will laugh at you. The Americans will take movies of you and show them in New York.”It mattered what account they gave of themselves to the world. And their concern with this point also was a concern deeply imbedded in Japanese culture.
The most famous question about Japanese attitudes concerned His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor. What was the hold of the Emperor on his subjects? Some American authorities pointed out that through all Japan's seven feudal centuries the Emperor was a shadowy figurehead. Every man's immediate loyalty was due to his lord,the daimyo, and, beyond that, to the military Generalissimo, the Shogun. Fealty to the Emperor was hardly an issue. He was kept secluded in an isolated court whose ceremonies and activities were rigorously circumscribed by the Shogun's regulations. It was treason even for a great feudal lord to pay his respects to the Emperor, and for the people of Japan he hardly existed. Japan could only be understood by its history, these American analysts insisted; how could an Emperor who had been brought out from obscurity within the memory of still living people be the real rallying point of a conservative nation like Japan? The Japanese publicists who again and again reiterated the undying hold of the Emperor upon his subjects were over-protesting, they said, and their insistence only proved the weakness of their case. There was no reason, therefore, that American policy during the war should draw on kid gloves in dealing with the Emperor. There was every reason rather why we should direct our strongest attacks against this evil Führer concept that Japan had recently concocted. It was the very heart of its modern nationalistic Shinto religion and if we undermined and challenged the sanctity of the Emperor, the whole structure of enemy Japan would fall in ruins.
Many capable Americans who knew Japan and who saw the reports from the front fines and from Japanese sources were of the opposite persuasion. Those who had lived in Japan well knew that nothing stung the Japanese people to bitterness and whipped up their morale like any depreciatory word against the Emperor or any outright attack on him. They did not believe that in attacking the Emperor we would in the eyes of the Japanese be attacking militarism. They had seen that reverence for the Emperor had been equally strong in those years after the First World War when“de-mok-ra-sie”was the great watchword and militarism was so discredited that army men prudently changed to mufti before they went out on the streets of Tokyo. The reverence of the Japanese for their Imperial chief could not be compared, these old Japanese residents insisted, with Heil-Hitler veneration which was a barometer of the fortunes of the Nazi party and bound up with all the evils of a fascist program.
Certainly the testimony of Japanese prisoners of war bore them out. Unlike Western soldiers, these prisoners had not been instructed about what to say and what to keep silent about when captured and their responses on all subjects were strikingly unregimented. This failure to indoctrinate was of course due to Japan's no-surrender policy. It was not remedied until the last months of the war, and even then only in certain armies or local units. The prisoners’testimony was worth paying attention to for they represented a cross-section of opinion in the Japanese Army. They were not troops whose low morale had caused them to surrender-and who might therefore be atypical. All but a few were wounded and unconscious soldiers unable to resist when captured.
Japanese prisoners of war who were out-and-out bitterenders imputed their extreme militarism to the Emperor and were“carrying out his will,”“setting his mind at rest,”“dying at the Emperor's command.”“The Emperor led the people into war and it was my duty to obey.”But those who rejected this present war and future Japanese plans of conquest just as regularly ascribed their peaceful persuasions to the Emperor. He was all things to all men. The war-weary spoke of him as“his peace-loving Majesty”;they insisted that he“had always been liberal and against the war.”“He had been deceived by Tojo.”“During the Manchurian Incident he showed that he was against the military.”“The war was started without the Emperor's knowledge or permission. The Emperor does not like war and would not have permitted his people to be dragged into it. The Emperor does not know how badly treated his soldiers are.”These were not statements like those of German prisoners of war who, however much they complained that Hitler had been betrayed by his generals or his high command, nevertheless ascribed war and the preparations for war to Hitler as supreme inciter. The Japanese prisoner of war was quite explicit that the reverence given the Imperial Household was separable from militarism and aggressive war policies.
The Emperor was to them, however, inseparable from Japan.“A Japan without the Emperor is not Japan.”“Japan without the Emperor cannot be imagined.”“The Japanese Emperor is the symbol of the Japanese people, the center of their religious lives. He is a superreligious object.”Nor would he be blamed for the defeat if Japan lost the war.“The people did not consider the Emperor responsible for the war.”“In the event of defeat the Cabinet and the military leaders would take the blame, not the Emperor.”“Even if Japan lost the war ten out of ten Japanese would still revere the Emperor.”
All this unanimity in reckoning the Emperor above criticism appeared phoney to Americans who are accustomed to exempt no human man from skeptical scrutiny and criticism. But there was no question that it was the voice of Japan even in defeat. Those most experienced in interrogating the prisoners gave it as their verdict that it was unnecessary to enter on each interview sheet:“Refuses to speak against the Emperor”; all prisoners refused, even those who co-operated with the Allies and broadcast for us to the Japanese troops. Out of all the collected interviews of prisoners of war, only three were even mildly anti-Emperor and only one went so far as to say:“It would be a mistake to leave the Emperor on the throne.”A second said the Emperor was“a feeble-minded person, nothing more than a puppet.”And the third got no farther than supposing that the Emperor might abdicate in favor of his son and that if the monarchy were abolished, young Japanese women would hope to get a freedom they envied in the women of America.
Japanese commanders, therefore, were playing on an all but unanimous Japanese veneration when they distributed cigarettes to the troops“from the Emperor,”or led them on his birthday in bowing three times to the east and shouting“Banzai”; when they chanted with all their troops morning and evening,“even though the unit was subjected to day and night bombardment,”the“sacred words”the Emperor himself had given to the armed forces in the Rescript for Soldiers and Sailors while“the sound of chanting echoed through the forest.”The militarists used the appeal of loyalty to the Emperor in every possible way. They called on their men to“fulfill the wishes of His Imperial Majesty,”to“dispel all the anxieties of your Emperor,”to“demonstrate your respect for his Imperial benevolence,”to“die for the Emperor.”But this obedience to his will could cut both ways. As many prisoners said, the Japanese“will fight unhesitatingly, even with nothing more than bamboo poles, if the Emperor so decrees. They would stop just as quickly if he so decreed”;“Japan would throw down arms tomorrow if the Emperor should issue such an order”;“Even the Kwantung Army in Manchuria”—most militant and jingoistic—“would lay down their arms”:“only his words can make the Japanese people accept a defeat and be reconciled to live for reconstruction.”
This unconditional and unrestricted loyalty to the Emperor was conspicuously at odds with criticisms of all other persons and groups. Whether in Japanese newspapers and magazines or in war prisoners’testimony, there was criticism of the government and of military leaders. Prisoners of war were free with their denunciation of their local commanders, especially those who had not shared the dangers and hardships of their soldiers. They were especially critical of those who had evacuated by plane and left their troops behind to fight it out. Usually they praised some officers and bitterly criticized others; there was no sign that they lacked the will to discriminate the good from the bad in things Japanese. Even in the home islands newspapers and magazines criticized“the government”. They called for more leadership and greater coordination of effort and noted that they were not getting from the government what was necessary. They even criticized the restrictions on freedom of speech. A report on a panel of editors, former members of the Diet, and directors of Japan's totalitarian party, the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, printed in a Tokyo paper in July, 1944, is a good example. One speaker said:“I think there are various ways to arouse the Japanese people but the most important one is freedom of speech. In these few years, the people have not been able to say frankly what they think. They have been afraid that they might be blamed if they spoke certain matters. They hesitated, and tried to patch up the surface, so the public mind has really become timid. We can never develop the total power of the people in this way.”
Another speaker expanded the same theme:“I have held symposiums almost every night with the people of the electoral districts and asked them about many things, but they were all afraid to speak. Freedom of speech has been denied. This is certainly not a proper way to stimulate their will to fight. The people are so badly restricted by the so-called Special Penal Law of War Time and the National Security Law that they have become as timid as the people in the feudalistic period. Therefore the fighting power which could have been developed remains undeveloped now.”
Even during the war, therefore, the Japanese criticized the government, the High Command, and their immediate superiors. They did not unquestioningly acknowledge the virtues of the whole hierarchy. But the Emperor was exempt.How could this be when his primacy was so recent? What quirk of Japanese character made it possible that he should so attain a sacrosanct position? Were Japanese prisoners of war right in claiming that just as the people would fight to the death“with bamboo spears”as long as he so ordered, they would peaceably accept defeat and occupation if that was his command? Was this nonsense meant to mislead us? Or was it, possibly, the truth?
All these crucial questions about Japanese behavior in the war, from their antimaterialistic bias to their attitudes toward the Emperor concerned the homeland Japan as well as the fighting fronts. There were other attitudes which had to do more specifically with the Japanese Army. One of these concerned the expendability of their fighting forces. The Japanese radio put well the contrast with the American attitudes when it described with shocked incredulity the Navy's decoration of Admiral George S. McCain, commander of a task force off Formosa.
The official reason for the decoration was not that Commander John S. McCain was able to put the Japanese to flight, though we don't see why not since that is what the Nimitz communiqué claimed…. Well, the reason given for Admiral McCain's decoration was that he was able successfully to rescue two damaged American warships and escort them safely to their home base. What makes this bit of information important is not that it is a fiction but that it is the truth…. So we are not questioning the veracity of Admiral McCain's rescuing two ships, but the point we want you to see is the curious fact that the rescuing of damaged ships merits decoration in the United States.
Americans thrill to all rescue, all aid to those pressed to the wall. A valiant deed is all the more a hero's act if it saves the“damaged.”Japanese valor repudiates such salvaging. Even the safety devices installed in our B-29's and fighter planes raised their cry of“Cowardice.”The press and the radio returned to the theme over and over again. There was virtue only in accepting life and death risks; precautions were unworthy. This attitude found expression also in the case of the wounded and of malarial patients. Such soldiers were damaged goods and the medical services provided were utterly inadequate even for reasonable effectiveness of the fighting force. As time went on, supply difficulties of all kinds aggravated this lack of medical care, but that was not the whole story. Japanese scorn of materialism played a part in it; her soldiers were taught that death itself was a victory of the spirit and our kind of care of the sick was an interference with heroismlike safey devices in bombing planes. Nor are the Japanese used to such reliance on physicians and surgeons in civilian life as Americans are. Preoccupation with mercy toward the damaged rather than with other welfare measures is especially high in the United States, and is often commented on even by visitors from some European countries in peacetime. It is certainly alien to the Japanese. At all events, during the war the Japanese army had no trained rescue teams to remove the wounded under fire and to give first aid; it had no medical system of front line, behind-the-lines and distant recuperative hospitals. Its attention to medical supplies was lamentable. In certain emergencies the hospitalized were simply killed. Especially in New Guinea and the Philippines, the Japanese often had to retreat from a position where there was a hospital. There was no routine of evacuating the sick and wounded while there was still opportunity; only when the“planned withdrawal”of the battalion was actually taking place or the enemy was occupying was anything done. Then, the medical officer in charge often shot the inmates of the hospital before he left or they killed themselves with hand grenades.
If this attitude of the Japanese toward damaged goods was fundamental in their treatment of their own countrymen, it was equally important in their treatment of American prisoners of war. According to our standards the Japanese were guilty of atrocities to their own men as well as to their prisoners. The former chief medical officer of the Philippines, Colonel Harold W. Glattly, said after his three years’internment as a prisoner of war on Formosa that“the American prisoners got better medical treatment than the Japanese soldiers. Allied medical officers in the prison camps were able to take care of their men while the Japanese didn't have any doctors. For a while the only medical personnel they had for their own men was a corporal and later on a sergeant.”He saw a Japanese medical officer only once or twice a year.
The furthest extreme to which this Japanese theory of expendability could be pushed was their no-surrender policy. Any Occidental army which has done its best and finds itself facing hopeless odds surrenders to the enemy. They still regard themselves as honorable soldiers and by international agreement their names are sent back to their countries so that their families may know that they are alive. They are not disgraced either as soldiers or as citizens or in their own families. But the Japanese defined the situation differently. Honor was bound up with fighting to the death. In a hopeless situation a Japanese soldier should kill himself with his last hand grenade or charge weaponless against the enemy in a mass suicide attack. But he should not surrender. Even it he were taken prisoner when he was wounded and unconscious, he“could not hold up his head in Japan”again; he was disgraced; he was“dead”to his former life.
There were Army orders to this effect, of course, but there was apparently no need of special official indoctrination at the front. The Army lived up to the code to such an extent that in the North Burma campaign the proportion of the captured to the dead was 142 to 17,166. That was a ratio of 1:120. And of the 142 in the prison camps, all except a small minority were wounded or unconscious when taken; only a very few had“surrendered”singly or in groups of two or three. In the armies of Occidental nations it is almost a truism that troops cannot stand the death of one-fourth to one-third of their strength without giving up; surrenders run about 4:1. When for the first time in Hollandia, however, any appreciable number of Japanese troops surrendered, the proportion was 1:5 and that was a tremendous advance over the 1:120 of North Burma.
To the Japanese therefore Americans who had become prisoners of war were disgraced by the mere fact of surrender. They were“damaged goods”even when wounds or malaria or dysentery had not also put them outside the category of“complete men”. Many Americans have described how dangerous a thing American laughter was in the prison camps and how it stung their warders. In Japanese eyes they had suffered ignominy and it was bitter to them that the Americans did not know it. Many of the orders which American prisoners had to obey, too, were those which had also been required of their Japanese keepers by their own Japanese officers; the forced marches and the close-packed transshipments were common places to them. Americans tell, too, of how rigorously sentries required that the prisoners should cover up evasions of rules; the great crime was to evade openly. In camps where the prisoners worked off-bounds on roads or installations during the day the rule that no food be brought back with them from the countryside was sometimes a dead letter-if the fruit and vegetables were covered up. If they could be seen, it was a flagrant offense which meant that the Americans had flouted the sentry's authority. Open challenging of authority was terribly punished even if it were mere“answering back.”Japanese rules are very strict against a man's answering back even in civilian life and their own army practices penalized it heavily. It is no exoneration of the atrocities and wanton cruelties that did occur in the prison camps to distinguish between these and those acts which were the consequences of cultural habituations.
Especially in the earlier stages of the conflict the shame of capture was reinforced by a very real belief among the Japanese that the enemy tortured and killed any prisoners. One rumor of tanks that had been driven across the bodies of those captured on Guadalcanal spread through almost all areas. Some Japanese who tried to give themselves up, too, were regarded with so much suspicion by our troops that they were killed as a precaution, and this suspicion was often justified. A Japanese for whom there was nothing left but death was often proud that he could take an enemy with him when he died; he might do it even after he was captured. Having determined, as one of them put it,“to be burned on the altar of victory, it would be a disgrace to die with no heroic deed achieved.”Such possibilities put our Army on its guard and diminished the number of surrenders.
The shame of surrender was burned deeply into the consciousness of the Japanese. They accepted as a matter of course a behavior which was alien to our conventions of warfare. And ours was just as alien to them. They spoke with shocked disparagement of American prisoners of war who asked to have their names reported to their government so that their families would know they were alive. The rank and file, at least, were quite unprepared for the surrender of American troops at Bataan for they had assumed that they would fight it out the Japanese way. And they could not accept the fact that Americans had no shame in being prisoners of war.
The most melodramatic difference in behavior between Western soldiers and the Japanese was undoubtedly the cooperation the latter gave to the Allied forces as prisoners of war. They knew no rules of life which applied in this new situation; they were dishonored and their life as Japanese was ended. Only in the last months of the war did more than a handful imagine any return to their homeland, no matter how the war ended. Some men asked to be killed,“but if your customs do not permit this, I will be a model prisoner.”They were better than model prisoners. Old Army hands and long-time extreme nationalists located ammunition dumps, carefully explained the disposition of Japanese forces, wrote our propaganda and flew with our bombing pilots to guide them to military targets. It was as if they had turned over a new page; what was written on the new page was the opposite of what was written on the old, but they spoke the lines with the same faithfulness.
This is of course not a description of all prisoners of war. Some few were irreconcilable. And in any case certain favorable conditions had to be set up before such behavior was possible. American Army commanders were very understandably hesitant to accept Japanese assistance at face value and there were camps where no attempt was made to use any services they might have given. In camps where this was done, however, the original suspicion had to be withdrawn and more and more dependence was placed on the good faith of the Japanese prisoners.
Americans had not expected this right-about-face from prisoners of war. It was not according to our code. But the Japanese behaved as if, having put everything they had into one line of conduct and failed at it, they naturally took up a different line. Was it a way of acting which we could count on in post-war days or was it behavior peculiar to soldiers who had been individually captured? Like the other peculiarities of Japanese behavior which obtruded themselves upon us during the war, it raised questions about the whole way of life to which they were conditioned, the way their institutions functioned and the habits of thought and action they had learned.
在几乎所有的文化传统中，都有一套有关战争的信条，而且不管西方国家之间存在着怎样的差异，其中有些信条是被所有西方国家共同遵守的。例如，有些信条是催战号角号召全力作战，一旦出现局部败退时也会有一些相同的激励士气重新振作的方式；战死者与投降者之间的比率相对稳定，对待战争俘虏也有一定之规：这些在西方国家的战争中是可以预见到的，就是因为他们共同拥有一种涵盖了战争事务在内的文化传统。
在战争惯例方面，日本人区别于西方的所有表现，都为他们的生活观点和对人的全部责任的看法提供了证据。为了对日本文化和日本人的行为有一个系统化的研究，它们中间有一些可能会很重要，因为它们提出了有关日本人性格的问题，需要我们去回答。至于它们背离我们教条的那些表现形式在军事上是否重要，这并非问题之关键。
日本人确认他们的战争属于正义的唯一前提，刚好与美国相反。她判断国际形势也与我们不同。美国人认为战争的根源在于轴心国的入侵。通过一系列征服行动，意大利和德国非正义地冒犯了世界和平。不管是轴心国以强力获取“满洲国”，还是埃塞俄比亚或者波兰，这些都证明他们在进行一项压迫弱者的罪恶方针。他们违背了“自己活也得让别人活”的世界准则；或者，至少可以说他们违背了针对自由商业活动“门户开放”的世界准则。日本对待战争根源则是另一种视角。在日本人看来，只要世界上存在着绝对主权，那么这个世界就充斥着无政府状态。因此对日本来说，有必要为了建立一个等级社会而战——当然是在日本的统治之下。因为日本是唯一的真正从上至下的等级社会，因此，只有她能理解“各得其所”的重要性。日本在国内已经取得了统一与和平，已经镇压了匪帮，已经建成了道路、电力设施、钢铁工业；而且，根据官方数字，他们已经在公共学校中对青少年进行了高达99.5%的教育普及。因此，根据他们有关等级制的前提，日本有必要来帮比她落后的小兄弟中国一把。作为大东亚相同种族的一员，她有责任将美国从这一区域清除，随后是清除英国和俄罗斯，让他们都“各得其所”。所有国家要浑然一体，其稳固的基础就是国际等级制度。在下一章里我们将讨论这种建立在等级制上的价值观对于日本文化到底意味着什么。这是日本人制造出来的一个幻梦，也是他们眼里最适合他们的幻梦。对于日本来说，不幸在于她所占领的那些国家并不以这种视角看待这一幻梦。即使日本最后战败了，她也没有开始对她的大东亚共荣圈的构想进行道德批判，甚至在日本战俘中，那些并非强硬派的人也很少指责日本在东亚大陆和南太平洋的目标。在很长很长的时间里，日本必将保持着他们已经根深蒂固的态度，这其中最重要的一点，是他们对于等级制的信仰和自信。虽然这对于爱好平等的美国来说实在太奇怪了，但是对我们来说，有必要去了解等级制对日本意味着什么，以及日本在实行等级制中获得了什么优势。
日本建立胜利希望的基础也与我们美国国内流行的不一样。日本人叫嚷说：他们会赢得战争，精神能够战胜物质。美国的确强大，它的设备也精良，但是这又有什么用呢？他们说，所有这些都是可以预见的，他们并没放在眼里。日本人在他们的一家大报纸《每日新闻》上读到这样的话：“如果我们惧怕这些数学符号，也就不会发起战争。敌人的大部分资源并不是在这场战争中生产出来的。”
甚至在日本打胜仗的时候，她的官方发言人、她的大本营以及她的士兵都一再重复说，不存在军备竞赛；这是一场他们信仰的“精神”和美国人信仰的“物质”之间的战争。当我们打胜仗的时候，他们一再重复说，在这样一场竞赛中，物质力量必然会遭到失败。当日本在塞班岛和硫磺岛遭遇惨败[1]之后，这一信条无疑会成为日本一个很合理的辩解，但它并不是为了给惨败做辩解才制造出来的。它是日本打胜仗期间的一个宣传口号，在珍珠港袭击之前它就已经被当作一句口号来接受。20世纪30年代，狂热的军国主义者、一度是陆军大臣的荒木[2]将军曾经在一个《告日本国民书》的小册子里写道：日本的真正使命是“弘扬皇道于四海。力量不足尚且不担心，那么我们又何必担心物质？”
当然，就像其他一些国家备战时一样，他们实际上也在担忧军备。整个30年代，日本军备占国民收入的比重呈现天文数字般的增长。在袭击珍珠港期间，几乎一半的国民收入都被投入陆军和海军的军备。而且政府的所有支出中，只有17%用于不得不进行的民用项目。日本和西方国家之间的差别并不在于日本对军备物资不关心。舰船和枪炮恰恰是不朽的日本精神的外在表现形式。它在日本人价值观中的象征意义，就跟武士的刀被作为美德象征一样。
日本一贯重视非物质资源，这跟美国追逐强大一样。日本和美国都不得不开展满负荷生产运动，但是日本人开展这一运动是基于她自身所设的前提。他们说，精神就是一切，而且是永恒的，当然物质也必不可少，但它们是次要的、瞬间的。日本的电台叫嚣说：“物质资源是有限的，原因在于没有能维持千年的物质。”他们对精神的依赖原封不动地被运用于战争事务中。他们的战术理论中运用了这样的口号：“以我们的严格训练来对抗敌人数量上的优势，以我们的血肉之躯来对抗敌人的钢铁武器。”这种口号是一种传统形式，并不是专门为了这次战争而提出的。他们的战争宣传册开头印着这样的黑体字：“必读必胜（只要阅读了这些，战争就能获得胜利）。”那些驾驶着小型飞机的飞行员以自杀式姿态去轰炸我们的战舰，就是精神战胜物质的实证教材。他们称呼这些人为“神风特攻队”,“神风”一词来源于那场拯救了日本的神圣的风，13世纪时成吉思汗对日本发动了攻击，而正是一场所谓的神风将他的战船粉碎并掀翻了。[3]
即使是在平民的生活中，日本官方也按照字面意义来宣传精神相对于物质条件的优势。人们12个小时在工厂劳作，还要遭受整夜的轰炸。他们感到疲惫吗？“我们的身体越累，我们的意志越高昂。我们的精神正是由它们展现出来。”“我们越累，我们的训练效果就越辉煌。”冬季，人们在防空洞中感到寒冷吗？电台里，大日本体育文化协会号召大家练习能使身体保持温暖的体操，说它不仅是取暖设施和温暖床具的替代品，而且更好的是，它能替代维持正常体能所需但现在正匮乏的物资。“当然，可能会有人说，在目前食物短缺的情况下，我们不能考虑做体操。不！食物越是短缺，我们越需要通过其他方式提高我们的身体能量。”这就是说，我们必须通过消耗超过我们体力的方式来增强我们的体力。美国人对身体能量的观点是，要看他昨天是否有八个或五个小时的睡眠时间，要看他是否吃到他所习惯的饮食，要看他是否感到寒冷，然后再计算可以消耗多少体力。日本人的计算方法则全然不是按照积攒的能力来预估消耗。他们将其列为物质主义。
在战争期间，日本的广播在这方面表现得更为极端。在战斗中，精神甚至可以克服肉身已经死亡这一事实。一个广播节目描述了一个英雄飞行员战胜死亡的奇迹：
在战斗结束之后，日本战机以三四架为小队返回基地。一位上尉在最先回来的一队中。他降落后，站在地上用双筒望远镜看天空。当他的人回来时，他一架一架地数。他看起来很苍白，但是他依旧保持镇定。在最后一架飞机返回时，他写了一份报告，向指挥部走去。在指挥部，他向总指挥官做了报告。然而他一完成报告，就忽然倒在地上。现场的军官立刻冲上去施救。但是！他已经死去。经过检查发现，他的身体已经冰冷。他胸口中了致命一枪。一个刚刚死去的人的尸体不能是冰冷的，然而这位死去的上尉的尸体却像冰一样冷。这位上尉一定死去很长时间了，正是他的精神支持他做了这份报告。这位死去的上尉拥有的那种极其强烈的责任感成就了这样一桩神奇的事实。
当然，美国人会认为这是一桩不靠谱的奇谈，但是受过教育的日本人却并不嘲笑这一广播节目。他们确信日本人听到时也并不认为这是个荒诞不经的故事。他们首先会指出，广播以确信的口气说，那位上尉的事迹是“一桩神奇的事实”。
但是，为什么不能有奇迹呢？灵魂是可以训练的，很明显这位上尉是个自我训练的高手。既然所有日本人都知道“一个镇定的灵魂可以维持千年之久”，那么一个战机上尉的灵魂为什么不能在尸体上存在数个小时呢？何况他已经将“责任感”当作他整个生命中最核心的准则。日本人相信通过技术训练可以提升一个人的精神。这位上尉学到了，并且从中获益匪浅。
作为美国人，我们可以根本不信日本人这些极端的说法，而且会将其视为一个贫困民族的借口，或者是一个受蛊惑者的幼稚表现。然而，我们越是这么认为，我们就越难对付他们，不管是在战时还是在和平时期。日本人的信念是通过一定的禁忌和排斥，通过一定的练习和修炼方法，来深深植根于心中的。这些信念并不是孤立的怪癖。美国人只有认识到这一点，才能理解日本人以下言语是什么意思：战败了才认识到精神并不是万能的；“手持竹枪”来守住阵地简直是个笑话。更为重要的是，我们能够掌握他们所说的“光有精神尚不够”的含义：美国人的精神无论在战场还是在工厂都是能和他们相匹敌的。就像他们在战败后所说的那样：整个战争期间他们“表现得太主观了”。
不仅仅是强调等级制的必要性和精神至上观，日本人在战争期间解读各类事情的方法，都给学者提供了一个比较文化现象的例证。他们不断地说，安全感和士气都是要提前做好的准备工作。不管发生了什么样的灾难，不管是平民区遭受的空袭，还是塞班岛的惨败，或者是菲律宾的失守，日本提供给国民的宣传语都是：这些都是事先预知的，因此也就没什么可担心的。电台把这些口号发挥到极致，它们告诉日本人民，他们仍旧生活在一个完全已知的世界，以此来让日本人民清楚地感到，自己还可以依赖这种安全感：“美国人占领了基斯卡岛[4]，这让日本人处于美军轰炸圈之内，但是我们对此早已预估，并且为此做了必要的准备。”“敌人肯定会陆、海、空联合对我们发动反攻，但是这早已被考虑在我们的作战计划之内。”那些日本战俘，甚至那些希望日本早日停止这场没有希望的战争的战俘们，都确信轰炸并不能削弱日本本土人的士气，“因为他们对此早有了思想准备”。在美国人开始轰炸日本城市时，飞机制造业协会的副会长还在广播里说：“敌机最终还是来了，就在我们的头顶。但是我们这些致力于飞机制造工业的人已经对应付他们做了很充足的准备，可以说我们一直在期盼这一天的到来。因此没有什么可担心的。”只有在所有事情都是预知的、所有事情都已经计划好时，日本人才能继续坚持自己认为非常有必要的主张：所有事情都是由他们按照自己的意志单独完成；没有人能够强加给他们什么。“我们不应该考虑我们是在被动遭到袭击，而应该认为，我们主动促成敌人来攻击我们。”“敌人，你希望他来，他才会来。”他们不说“最终该来的还是来了”,“我们应该说，我们一直在期待他到来。我们很高兴他到来。”日本海军大将在国会上引用了19世纪70年代一位伟大战士西乡隆盛[5]的教谕：“世上有两种机会：一种是我们碰上的，一种是我们创造的。在最艰难的时刻，一个人必须不放弃制造机会。”当美国舰队开进马尼拉时，据电台说，山下将军[6]露出“明朗的笑容”:“敌人入吾彀中矣……”“在敌人泊进仁牙因湾[7]后不久，马尼拉急剧陷落，但这只不过是山下将军的计谋中的结果，并且吻合了他的计划。山下将军的运筹还在不断落实中。”换句话说，人要想失败，没什么能比这个更容易获得成功的了。
美国人和日本人一样，不过是在相反方向上走了极端。美国人全力以赴投入战争，是因为战斗是别人强加于我们的——我们遭到了袭击，因此要还敌人以颜色，好让他们清醒清醒。那些谋划如何确保国家安全的政治家们，没有一个敢说珍珠港事件[8]和巴丹半岛事件[9]“全盘都在我们的计划之内”；相反，我们的官员会说：“敌人找上门来了，我们要给他们一点颜色看看。”美国人不断调整自己的生活方式来适应不断变化的富有挑战性的世界——并且准备好接受挑战。相反的是，日本人的安全感更多是基于那种计划好的、运筹好的生活方式，最大的威胁来自于未能预料到的事物。
日本人的战争行为中另一个不断出现的主题，同样揭示了日本人的生活方式。他们不断说“世界的眼睛都在盯着我们”，因此他们必须充分展现日本精神。当美国人在瓜达尔卡纳尔岛[10]登陆时，日本军队给士兵的命令是，他们现在就处于“世界”的直接关注之下，他们要表现出自己的男儿本色。日本海军官兵们被训诫说，一旦他们遭到鱼雷袭击，或者接到放弃舰船的命令，他们应该在操作救生艇时表现出最高标准的仪态，不然“世界将会取笑你，美国人将会将你的丑态拍入电影，并且在纽约展示它们。”——值得他们考虑的是自己准备给世界留一个什么样的印象。他们对这一点如此关注，也来源于日本文化。
有关日本人的态度中，最引人注目的问题是：他们怎么看待他们的皇帝陛下，即天皇。天皇对于他的国民的控制力有多大？美国的权威学者指出，在整整7个世纪的日本封建时期，天皇是一个影子领袖，有名无实。每一个人尽忠的对象是他的主君——大名，以及大名之上的军事大元帅——幕府将军。对天皇的忠诚很难成为一个议题。天皇在一个被隔绝的皇宫中隐居，他的仪式和活动都受到幕府将军制定的规则的严格制约。甚至一个大名对天皇表达了尊敬，会被视同于背叛幕府将军；而且，对于日本人民来说，天皇几乎不存在。这些美国分析家们坚持认为，要理解日本只能通过它的历史，一个虽然活着但在国民记忆中模模糊糊的形象，怎么能够成为保守如日本这样一个国家的真正的凝聚人心的中心？他们认为，日本宣传机构一遍又一遍重申他们的天皇对其臣民有永世不坠的统治权，只不过是夸大其辞，日本人这么坚持只不过证明了这一论据是多么的虚弱。因此，美国在战争时期的政策中没有理由给天皇准备一个金钟罩。我们应该针对这个邪恶的、日本人近代以来才炮制出来的所谓元首发动最强劲的攻势。理由也非常充分：天皇是日本现代国家神道的核心，如果我们挑战并摧毁天皇的神性，敌国日本的整个社会结构将陷于瘫痪。
不少有才干的美国人则持反对的态度。他们了解日本，并且从前线和日本看到过相关报告。那些在日本生活过的人都深知，没有什么能比对天皇使用不敬言语，或者公然攻击天皇，更能刺痛日本人，也更能激发日本人士气了。他们并不相信，在日本人眼中攻击天皇等于攻击军国主义。虽然在第一次世界大战之后，“民主”成为一个伟大的口号，军国主义遭到质疑，导致东京军人上街之前都要谨慎地换上便服；但在日本生活的人看到，天皇在战后受到一如既往的崇拜。那些曾居住在日本的人坚持认为：日本人对于他们的帝国元首的崇拜，并不能与“希特勒万岁”那样的崇拜相提并论，希特勒崇拜是记录纳粹党命运的一个晴雨表，并且与所有法西斯的邪恶计划联系在一起。
当然，日本战俘的证言也证实了这一点。并不像西方士兵那样，日本战俘并没有接受过被俘时该说什么、不该说什么的教导，而且他们对于所有问题的回应出奇地不一致。当然，之所以不对士兵灌输这些内容，要归因于日本的不投降政策。直到战争的最后几个月，这一政策也没有做修改，但那时不投降政策已经只可见于一部分军队和地方军团。战俘的证言之所以值得关注，是因为它们成为反映日本军人的观点的一个横切面。他们并不是那种因士气太低才投降的士兵，也并不是那种神乎其神的士兵。只有那些受伤的和昏迷的士兵因无法抵抗才被俘。
全心全意而且坚忍不屈的日本战犯把极端的军国主义归因于天皇，他们说自己“执行天皇的旨意”,“为了让天皇安心”,“领受天皇命令赴死以战”。“天皇领导人民进行战争，服从是我的天职。”但是反对当下的战争以及日本未来征服计划的人，也常常将他们的和平主义归因于天皇。天皇在不同的人心中，面目也不相同。饱受战争之苦的人说他是“热爱和平的陛下”，他们坚持认为天皇“一贯宽厚仁慈，反对战争”,“他是被东条英机欺骗了”,“在满洲事变[11]中陛下显示出他是反对军国主义的”,“战争开始时天皇并不知晓，也没有得到他的准许。天皇并不喜欢战争，也不希望他的臣民被拖入战争泥淖。天皇并不知道他的士兵遭到怎样恶劣的对待”云云。这样的陈述跟那些德国战俘不同，很多德国战俘都对背叛希特勒的将军们和高级指挥官们非常不满，但是他们也将战争以及备战归咎于希特勒，认为他是煽动战争的源头。日本战俘却十分明确：对皇室的崇拜和军国主义、侵略的战争政策是相互分离的。
然而，对日本人来说，天皇与日本又是密不可分的。“没有天皇的日本就不再是日本。”“没有天皇的日本是不可想象的。”“日本天皇是日本国民的象征，是国民宗教生活的核心。他是一个超越宗教的信仰对象。”如果日本战败，他并不为失败而遭到指责。“国民并不认为天皇应为战争负责。”“如果失败，内阁和军部将领们应该承担罪责，而不是天皇。”“即使日本战败，百分之百的国民仍然崇拜天皇。”
日本人一致认为天皇超越于批评之上，这在美国人看来完全是欺人之谈，因为美国人一贯认为，任何人都不能免受审查和批评。但这的确就是日本人的看法，尽管他们战败了。那些曾经无数次讯问战俘的经验人士证实，根本没有必要在每一份讯问记录簿上都标上一句“拒绝说反对天皇的话”；因为所有战俘都拒绝说这样的话，甚至那些已经与盟军合作且为我们向日本军队进行广播宣传的战俘也拒绝这么做。在所有收集的战俘讯问记录中，只有三个人委婉地表达了反对天皇的意思，其中只有一个程度比较激烈，他说：“如果为天皇继续保留宝座将是一个错误。”第二个说天皇是“一个性情软弱的人，只不过是个傀儡”。第三个更倾向于认为天皇为了他儿子应该退位；而且如果君主立宪制被废除，年轻的日本女人有希望获得她们所羡慕的美国女人所拥有的自由。
因此，日本的指挥官们利用了日本人这种最一致的崇拜行为：他们在给部下分发香烟时强调香烟“来自天皇”，或者在天皇生日那天，率领部下向日本本土三鞠躬，并且高呼“万岁”;“甚至部队被日夜轰炸所控制时”，他们还坚持早晚两次和部下一起吟咏天皇给军队发布的《军人敕谕》中的“神圣言语”,“奉诵声回荡在森林中”。军国主义者在利用人们对天皇的效忠时，无所不用其极。他们号召官兵“完成皇帝陛下的意愿”,“为天皇解忧”,“向仁慈的天皇表达尊敬”,“为天皇去死”。但是这种对天皇意愿的服从可以花开两朵：就像一些战俘所说的那样，“只要天皇下令，日本人哪怕手里只有一杆竹枪，也会毫不犹豫投入战争。同样，只要天皇发布了停战令，他们也会很快停止战斗。”“日本第二天就能放下武器，只要天皇发布了这样的命令。”“甚至最激进好战的满洲关东军也将放下他们的武器。”“只有他发话了，才能使日本国民接受失败，并且甘心为重建而生活。”
对天皇无条件、没有任何抗拒的效忠，对天皇之外的个人和集体却大肆抨击，这两者形成了鲜明的对比。不管是日本的报纸还是杂志，或是战犯的证言中，都有对政府和军事统帅的批评。战犯对于军事统帅的批评肆无忌惮，尤其是对那些没有与他们一起共患难的军事统帅。他们激烈批评那些乘飞机逃脱，却留下大部队血战到底的军事官员。通常他们会赞扬一些官员而激烈批评另一些，没有迹象表明他们缺乏足够的辨别力来区分日本人的好坏。甚至日本本土的报纸和杂志也会批评“政府”。它们召唤更强有力的领导和协同一致的努力，并指责政府不能让人满意。他们甚至抨击政府限制言论自由。以下是一个很好的例子：1944年6月，东京一家报纸刊登了一份会议座谈记录，新闻记者、前国会议员、日本极权主义党派“大政翼赞会”[12]领袖都参加了这次会议。一个发言人说：“我相信有很多渠道来唤醒日本民众，但其中最重要的一条就是言论自由。近几年来，民众不能很坦白地说出心中所想。他们担心如果自己就某一特定话题发表言论会被怪罪。他们犹豫担心，于是开始随大流，因此公众思维也就变得怯懦起来。在这种情况下我们无法发掘出民众的力量。”
另一个发言人扩展了前一个人的意思：“我和选区的民众几乎每晚都举行座谈会，我问他们很多事情，但是他们都不愿意说话。言论自由被屏蔽了。这对于刺激他们的战争意识，显然不是一条好路子。民众被《战时特别刑法》和《治安维持法》这两个法律严重限制了自由，导致他们变得和封建时代的人民一样怯懦。因此，那些应该发展起来的战斗力没能激发出来。”
甚至在战时，日本人也会批评政府，批评军事统帅，批评他们的直属长官。他们认同整个等级制度的价值，但并不是完全没有质疑。不过天皇例外，他不会受到任何批评。他的至高无上的地位是近代才确立起来的，那么他是怎么被豁免在外的？是日本人性格中有什么怪癖，才导致天皇获得这么超级神圣的地位吗？难道真如那些战犯所说，“手持竹枪也要死战到底”的人，一旦天皇命令投降，他们就会心态平和地承认失败，接受占领？是否是他们故意欺骗，想将我们引入歧途？或者，他们说的是真的？
从他们反物质的偏见到他们对待天皇的态度，所有这些战争期间日本人的行为方面至关重要的问题，涵盖了所有日本人，既包括日本本土的人，也包括在前线作战的日本人。但是还有一些其他的态度是日本军人所独具的。这就是针对战斗力消耗的态度。美国人为指挥争夺台湾岛战役的海军上将乔治·S.麦凯恩[13]授予勋章，日本电台对此表示极其震惊，感觉难以置信。电台的态度显示出日本人和美国人在这方面的观点截然相反：
对司令官约翰·S.麦凯恩授勋的官方原因，并不是说他击退了日本人，尽管我们不能明白为什么这么做，因为尼米兹公报中已经公布了他击退日本人的消息……海军上将麦凯恩被授予勋章的原因居然是，他能够成功地将两艘已经损毁的战舰撤退，而且护送它们回本国基地。这一消息之所以重要，不是因为它是虚构的，而是它是真实的……我们并不是怀疑麦凯恩将军是否真的成功撤退两艘战舰，我们想点出来的是，成功撤退被损毁的战舰居然在美国获得勋章，这是一件多么奇怪的事。
美国人为所有的救援欢呼，愿意为那些被逼入绝境的人提供所有援助。如果一个英勇的行为再加上他拯救了那些“受损的”船舰，那就是一件英雄事迹。日本的勇士们则拒绝这种海上救助。甚至我们的B-29战机和战舰上装载有救生设施都被他们耻笑为“胆小鬼”。报纸和电台中这样的嘲笑话题连篇累牍。在日本人那里，唯一的荣耀是视死如归，提前做出预防完全是不足取的。在针对受伤者和疟疾患者的态度中，也可以看到这一观念。这些战士在他们眼里就是“受损的物资”，但是在日本军营中，即使是为了战斗力能够获得有效补充而必需的医疗设施也严重不足。随着时间推移，各方面的补给困难使这种医疗设施的短缺严重恶化；但是，这还不是事实的全部。日本人对于物质主义的嘲笑也成为其中一个原因。日本军人被教导说，死亡本身就是精神的胜利。而且，我们对于疾病患者和伤者的照顾，和轰炸机上安装救生设施一样，都被日本军人视为对英雄主义的妨碍。在平民生活中，日本人也不像我们美国人那样依赖于内外科医生。在美国，看见受伤者，怜悯会油然而生，这种情感比其他福利措施都还要优先出现。在和平时期，来自欧洲的访问者经常谈及这一点。但日本人对此完全是陌生的。无论如何，在战争中，日本军队根本没有受过训练的救援队，所以没有人在火线下转移伤者并第一时间救援，也没有前方、后方、内地一整套用以治疗复元的医疗设施。他们对待医疗补给的态度让人很不快。在一些极端场合，那些本该住院的人居然简单地以枪杀来处理。尤其是在新几内亚和菲律宾，日本人经常不得不从有医院的某处撤退，那时，即使有机会，也没有撤退病人和伤者的程序。只有在实施所谓“有计划的后撤”时，或者敌人占领了阵地时，他们才采取一些措施。那时，负责医疗的长官在离开之前通常会射杀同在医院的战士们，或者是伤病员用手雷炸死自己。
如果说日本人对待伤病员的态度是他们对待自己国人最基本的表现，那么，这一点对处理美国战俘也起了重要作用。按照我们的标准，日本人无论对待国人还是战俘，都犯了残暴的罪行。菲律宾前任军医哈沃德·W.格兰特里上校在台湾岛作战时作为战俘被扣留。3年之后，他说：“美国战俘比日本军人获得的待遇还要好。在战俘营，盟军军医能够照料他们自己的人，而日本军人中间却没有医生。有一段时间，日本军队唯一能为他们自己提供的医疗人员是一个下士，后来是一个中士。”他在一年中只看到一两个日本军医。[14]
展现日本人的牺牲观的最极端的例证是，日本人没有“投降”这一说。任何西方军队，只要他们尽力了，如若发现胜利无望，他们会选择向敌人投降。他们依旧视自己为荣耀的战士。根据国际协议，他们的名字被通知本国，这样他们的家人就可以知道他们还活着。在家人眼里，他们不管作为军人还是公民，名誉都不会受损。但是，日本人完全拒绝这样的情况出现。荣耀就是战斗到最后一刻。在无望的情形下，一个日本军人要么是用最后的手雷炸死自己，要么是在一场集团式的自杀袭击中，赤手空拳对抗敌人；但是，他不会投降。即使他在受伤或者无意识状态下被俘虏，他“在日本再也无法抬起头来”，他是满身耻辱的人，对于他以前的生活来说，他已经“死了”。
当然，这也是因为军队命令中就有这样的规定，但是很显然，在前线根本不需要专门教导日本战士不投降。日本军队已经严守这一军纪，以下例证就可以证明：在缅北会战中[15]，日本军人被俘获的人数与死亡人数之比是142:17166，即1:120。142个被关在战俘集中营的日本军人中，除了一小部分送进来时是受伤或无意识外，单个投降或者两三个一起投降的非常之少。西方国家军队所信任的真理是：一支军队因为没有投降而损失了1/4至1/3的有生力量，这是不可容忍的。因此，投降者与伤亡人数之比通常是4:1。然而，在霍兰迪亚[16]日军第一次大规模投降时，他们能被接受的比例是1:5。在缅北会战中，这一比例达到了一个极端的1:120。
因此，在日本人看来，美国有那么多战俘实在很丢脸，因为这些人都是投降来的。这些投降的人才是“受损的物资”；相对而言，那些受伤的，或者得疟疾的以及得痢疾的，都还没有被排除在“真正的男人”之外。不少美国人曾经描述过一个美国人在战俘集中营中大笑是多么危险的事，因为它将严重激怒他们的日本守卫。让日本人感到难以容忍的是，他们认为美国战俘已经是满身耻辱的人，这些美国人自己却认识不到这一点。一些美国战俘必须遵守的规则，日本军官要求看守俘虏的日本兵同样也要遵守。急行军和被关在狭小空间中随着运输工具转移，对于这些日本守卫们来说也是家常便饭。美国战俘还说过，那些严苛的看守们如何严格要求他们掩盖逃跑行为，在那里最大的罪恶是公然逃跑。集中营的战俘偶尔会到外面筑路或修建其他设施，有一个规则是不准把他们在外面吃的东西带回来，这一规则有时就是空文——只要把水果或者蔬菜遮盖起来就行。但如果它们被发现，那么就是不能被容忍的冒犯，因为这说明美国战俘在蔑视日本看守的权威。公开挑战权威通常会遭到很严厉的惩罚，哪怕“顶嘴”也不行。日本人在平民生活中对顶嘴的惩罚也很严厉，在他们自己的军队中对此等行为的惩罚就更严重了。在战俘营中存在着很多残酷处罚和残忍暴行，但是我将作为文化习俗的暴虐行为和单纯的暴虐行为本身区分开，并不是要宽容暴虐行为。
尤其是在战争的早期阶段，日本士兵普遍相信一个传闻，说是敌人残忍虐待战俘并全部杀光，这一传闻让投降更增添了耻辱感。有一个谣言说是，在瓜达康纳尔岛上坦克车碾过那些战俘的尸体，这一谣言散布很广。即使有一些日本军人想要投降，我们的部队因为对其投降态度很怀疑，于是为了预防假投降而将他们杀死，这就让日本士兵的怀疑更加被证实了。这样，一个日本人除了死亡而别无选择时，那他就会为自己死的时候还捎带了一个敌人而自豪。在他被俘虏的时候也会这么做。就像一个日本军人所说：“既然已经下定决心在胜利的祭坛上燃烧自己，那么在还没有取得英雄般的成就之前就死亡，是一件很耻辱的事。”这种可能性使得我们的军队更加警惕，这也进一步减少了日本军投降者的数目。
投降的耻辱感一直燃烧到日本人的良心深处。他们把这事看得太严重，这种观念在我们的战争惯例中完全是陌生的。我们的观念在他们看来也是完全陌生的。当美国战俘要求日本人把自己的名字通报给美国政府，以便让家人知道自己还活着时，他们非常震惊，也极度蔑视。至少，日本普通士兵们没有为在巴丹半岛投降的美国兵们准备这些，因为这些日本兵假定美国兵也会照着他们日本的方式来做。他们也实在无法理解，美国人在成为战俘后居然不感到羞耻。
在西方士兵和日本士兵行为之间最富有戏剧性的差异，无疑表现在日本士兵成为战俘后跟盟军合作。他们的生命规则没有如何适应新环境这一条，他们已经没有名誉可言，他们作为日本人的日子已经结束了。只是在战争结束前的最后几个月，才有少数人开始幻想他们返回祖国后的日子，而不考虑战争是怎么结束的。一些人要求被杀死，“但如果你们的惯例不允许这样，那么我将做一个模范战俘。”事实上他比模范战俘还要做得好。一些老兵以及长期的极端国家主义者，为我们指点军火库的位置，仔细地解释日军军事力量的部署，为我们的宣传出力，跟我们的轰炸机飞行员一道起飞，为我们指点军事目标。看上去他们的生命就像重新翻开了一页，而且新的一页上所写的内容与往日的是完全相反的，但是他们都遵循了“忠诚”这一原则。
当然，这并不能用来描述所有的战俘。少数人是坚决不合作的。并且，无论如何，这些行为有可能发生还得需要美国人提供一些可靠的、讨人喜欢的条件。所以，可以理解，美国军队指挥官们在接受日本人这些表面上的帮助时是很犹豫的。有些战俘营根本没打算接受利用他们本来可以获取的帮助。但是，在接受了日本士兵指点的战俘营中，最初的猜疑必然会消失，同时也越来越信赖于日本战俘的忠实。
美国人原本没有预料到战俘会180°大转变。这不符合我们的原则。但日本人的表现好像是：他选定了一个方向走下去，但发现失败了，他们自然就采纳了另一个方向。我们在战后能指望利用这种行为方式吗？这种行为是否只是那些单独被俘获的日本士兵才表现出的特殊行为？就像日本人其他一些行为的特殊性强迫我们在战争期间思考一样，它还提出了以下问题：他们在什么样的前提下采取了这样的生活方式？他们的各种制度运行的方式是什么？他们所习得的思维和行动习惯是什么？
注释：
[1] 硫磺岛地处东京和塞班岛的中间位置，地理位置十分重要。1945年2月16日至3月26日，日军和美军激战月余，美军虽然最终占领硫磺岛，但双方均伤亡惨重。其中23000名固守硫磺岛的日军里，只有1083人生还。美军则有6812人死亡，19189人负伤。这是第二次世界大战中太平洋战场上最激烈的一场战斗。
[2] 即荒木贞夫（1877～1966），出生于有武士传统的家庭，担任陆军大臣期间，极力推动日军不断扩大对华侵略范围。1945年被宣判无期徒刑后关于东京鸭巢监狱，1955年因病获假。
[3] 作者在这里出现了记忆错误，部署舰队攻日的不是成吉思汗，而是忽必烈。1274年忽必烈发动了第一次征日战争，但是遭到了失败。此后日本加强了战备和工事。1280年早春元蒙和高丽战舰再次攻日，久久未能攻下。8月15日和16日，发生在亚太地区的季候性台风袭击了九州岛沿岸，数万元蒙和高丽将士在台风中舰毁人亡。在日本人看来，这次台风并不是自然现象，它是从神那里刮来的保护日本的神风。
[4] 基斯卡岛是阿拉斯加附近一座岛屿，1942年6月7日深夜，日军在主攻中途岛前佯攻基斯卡岛和阿图岛并占领两岛屿，以分散美军注意力。1943年7月，美军顺利收复阿图岛和基斯卡岛。
[5] 西乡隆盛（1828～1877），原名西乡隆永。明治维新的领导人。他和木户孝允、大久保利通并称“维新三杰”。因与大久保利通产生分歧，在萨摩藩发动叛乱，兵败身死。
[6] 即山下奉文（1885～1946），生于高知县。曾担任驻满洲第一方面军司令官。1944年10月，山下奉文到菲律宾马尼拉就职，担任第十四方面军司令官，指挥与美军作战。1945年3月，美军攻占马尼拉。1946年2月23日，山下奉文被马尼拉军事法庭判处绞刑。
[7] 仁牙因湾，位于菲律宾吕宋岛西岸。1945年1月9日，盟军炮轰仁牙因湾。登陆后，仁牙因湾变成一个大型供应基地以支援美军进攻马尼拉。
[8] 1941年12月7日清晨，日本联合舰队突袭美国海军太平洋舰队在夏威夷的基地珍珠港。这次袭击将美国卷入第二次世界大战。
[9] 巴丹半岛在菲律宾吕宋岛西南部。在日本偷袭珍珠港后，日本陆军也开始进军菲律宾。巴丹半岛上的美军和菲律宾守军与日军激战达4个月，最后因缺乏支援，于1942年4月9日向日军投降，当时美菲联军投降人数约有78000人。这些战俘被逼冒着酷暑在菲律宾的丛林中步行65英里路程到达一个战俘营，共有15000名士兵在途中倒毙或被日军杀害。这次事件是二战中的一桩惨案，当年的幸存者将其称为“巴丹半岛死亡之旅”。到达战俘营后，又因遭受日军拷打、被逼做苦役、挨饿等，两个月内又死去了约26000名战俘。
[10] 位于西南太平洋，是所罗门群岛中最大的一个岛。从1942年8月开始，美日双方在6个月的时间里进行了大小海战30余次。1943年2月，日本在该岛全面溃退。在这场旷日持久的战役中，日军共有约5万人丧生，军备损失更为惨重。战役结束时日军兵力上的优势已荡然无存。从此以后，日军不得不从战略进攻转为战略防御，直至战败。
[11] 中国称为“九一八事变”。
[12] 1940年10月12日，大政翼赞会成立。所谓“翼赞”，就是“帮助天皇”的意思。大政翼赞会是国民总动员体制的核心组织，主旨是引导国民的思想精神。总理大臣近卫文麿统领组织。日本战败后，大政翼赞会于1946年6月解散。
[13] 这里是作者的笔误，应和下文一样，为约翰·S.麦凯恩。麦凯恩于1944年担任美国第38特混舰队司令。在战争中，他因保护受重创的巡洋舰“休斯敦”号和“堪培拉”号通过战区回国而获得海军十字勋章。
[14] 引自1945年10月15日的《华盛顿邮报》报道。——原注
[15] 1943年10月，为重新打开中印交通线，中国驻印军总指挥史迪威将军制订了一个反攻缅北的作战计划，代号为“人猿泰山”。经过一年多的苦战，1945年3月，中印公路打通，会战结束。
[16] 新几内亚湾的一个岛屿，现为印度尼西亚东部一海港。1944年4月，美日为争夺此地而激战。