China-CEEC Cooperation Framework at 10: Context, Evolution and Prospects

Dragan Pavlićević, Vladimir Milić[1]

Abstract: The 10th anniversary of the China-CEEC Cooperation Framework represents an important juncture in China-CEEC relations and calls for a reflection on their trajectory and prospects. This chapter offers an overview of China-CEEC relations in the last decade by identifying the key factors that have shaped their development and investigating how perceptions, objectives and policies of the key actors have changed over time. It provides an original assessment of the adjustments made by the key actors in response to the shifting context of China-CEEC relations and an up-to-date assessment of the state of affairs at this critical stage in the development of the relations between China and Central and Eastern European countries and, more broadly, Europe.

Keywords: China-CEEC Cooperation Framework;China-CEEC Relations;Pragmatic Cooperation;Geopolitics;Policy Adjustments

“China-Central and Eastern European countries Cooperation Framework” （hereafter referred to as the Framework[2]）was created in 2012 to facilitate the development of relations between China and Central and Eastern European countries. The establishment of the Framework is widely regarded as synonymous with a new start of China-CEEC relations, which were mostly undeveloped in the previous period[3]. The mechanism originally included 16 CEE countries: 11 members of the European Union （EU）[4], and five countries[5] aspiring to become EU members. All countries except Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization （NATO）. From 2019, with the addition of Greece （an EU and NATO member）, the platform has been referred to as 17+1 （MFAPRC, 2019）. However, in May of 2021 first Lithuania left the framework, followed by Latvia and Estonia in August of 2022（Lau, 2021;Bērziņa-Čerenkova, 2022）, effectively downsizing the framework to a 14+1 format.

The establishment of the Framework was followed by the announcement of the Belt and Road Initiative （BRI）just a year later. All CEE countries signed the Memorandum of Understanding （MoU）of the BRI and officially supported the Initiative from the beginning （Sacks, 2021）. The BRI has since served as an umbrella policy concept for China’s foreign policy toward the Eurasian space and beyond. As such, the Framework and its objectives have been closely aligned with BRI—as already identifiable in the guiding document published following the first China-CEEC Summit with which the Framework was formally established （MFAPRC, 2012）. These objectives include improving hard and soft connectivity by developing transportation and energy infrastructure, growing trade and investment volumes, and developing governmental, business and people-to-people ties and cooperation across a comprehensive range of domains, as well as promoting policy synchronization.

The aims of the Framework and the implications of fast-developing China-CEE ties have been interpreted in starkly different terms. The official discourse in China and across CEE countries, at least in the early years, as well as sections of observers in academic and think tank circles, interpreted the Framework as an attempt to promote “pragmatic” cooperation, primarily in the economic domain （Liu, 2013;Vangeli, 2021）. At the same time, the assessment that China aimed to create divisions inside the EU and its neighborhood was influential in research and media reports, and then later on also within official circles in Western Europe and parts of CEE countries （Benner and Weidenfeld, 2018;Oertel, 2020）.

Nowadays, the political elites and the public in CEE are increasingly divided in how they understand the Framework and the relationship with China, while their counterparts in the EU and Western Europe remained unconvinced that China has benign intentions （European Parliament, Committee of Foreign Affairs, 2021）. As the Framework has reached its 10th anniversary in 2022, a range of internal and external challenges have resulted in a growing number of gloomy predictions about the future of China-CEE relations （Kavalski, 2021;Brînză, 2021）.

Given such diverging perceptions and evaluations of the Framework, as well as the questions over its future, the 10th anniversary of the framework represents an important juncture in China-CEEC relations and calls for an urgent reflection on their trajectory and prospects. This chapter aims to offer an overview of China-CEE relations in the last decade by identifying the key factors that have shaped their development, by investigating how perceptions, objectives and policies of the key actors have changed over time, as well as by assessing the adjustments made by the key actors in response to the changing context of China-CEE relations and the resultant status quo.

To that end, the chapter proceeds as follows: First, we contextualize the Framework and China-CEE relations against the backdrop of China-EU and CEE-EU relations. We argue that the dynamics and current predicament of China-CEE relations cannot be grasped without acknowledging the impact of the broader external environment, and in particular the role played by the EU and, increasingly in recent years, by the United States.

In the second part of the article, we then identify two five years long phases in the development of China-CEE relations and the Framework: The first phase roughly extends from 2012 to 2017 and is marked by all key actors—in particular China and CEE, but also the EU-exploring modalities of cooperation. At the same time, the Framework was rapidly developing its organizational structure and policy portfolio.

The second phase, lasting from 2017 until the present, however, is marked by the China-CEE relations being reconstrueded as a geopolitical battlefield. This change has caused China, CEE and the EU to adjust their approach to the Framework, which, in turn, has brought China-CEE relations into a state of stasis and, in some important aspects-deterioration. We offer an overview of how China-CEE relations developed in these two phases by outlining the main developments in each of the periods while zooming in on the rationalities which shaped China, CEE and the EU’s respective approaches to China-CEE relations in each of the periods[6]. We additionally capture similarities and differences in how CEE countries adapted to the changing context of the China-CEE relations and sought to adjust, and in some cases radically reposition, their relations with Beijing.

As such the chapter aims to contribute to the academic and analytic literature on the subject of China-CEE relations as follows: firstly, we contextualize China-CEE relations within a triangular relationship with the EU, and more broadly “West”. This perspective contributes to the existing academic debates which have identified the role conflict （Song and Furst, 2022）, the ideological differences （Turcsányi and Qiaoan, 2021）, diverging and unmet expectations （Turcsányi, 2020, Song and Song, 2020, Brînză, 2021, Kavalski, 2021）, among other, as the key explanatory variables for the trajectory of the relationship. We instead identify the changes in the perceptions of China and in broader strategic environment as the key variable for the development of China-CEE relations, and, likewise, the ongoing cooling of the relationship;secondly, this study supplements the existing perspectives on periodization of the Framework （e. g., Turcsányi, 2020;Liu, 2021）by focusing on the aforementioned structural factors that have caused transition;thirdly, we provide an original examination of the adjustments undertaken by the main actors and stakeholders that have taken place in the context of such development, which is an underappreciated and under-researched feature of China-CEE relations;lastly, we provide an up-to-date assessment of the state of affairs at the moment of writing.